Abstract. Many technics for randomness extraction over finite fields was proposed by various authors such as Fouque et al. and Carneti et al.. At eurocrypt'09, these previous works was improved by Chevalier et al., over a finite field Fp, where p is a prime. But their papers don't study the case where the field is not prime such as binary fields. In this paper, we present a deterministic extractor for a multiplicative subgroup of F * p n , where p is a prime. In particular, we show that the k-first F2-coefficients of a random element in a subgroup of F * 2 n are indistinguishable from a random bit-string of the same length. Hence, under the Decisional DiffieHellman assumption over binary fields, one can deterministically derive a uniformly random bit-string from a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in the standard model. Over Fp, Chevalier et al. use the "Polya-Vinogradov inequality" to bound incomplete character sums but over F * p n we use "Winterhof inequality" to bound incomplete character sums. Our proposition is a good deterministic extractor even if the length of its output is less than those one can have with the leftover hash lemma and universal hash functions. Our extractor can be used in any cryptographic protocol or encryption schemes.
Introduction
In many cryptographic protocols and cryptographic schemes, it is necessary to be able to derive a random bit-string from a random element in a group. This is the case for Diffie-Hellman key exchange [8] which is the most famous protocol that allows parties to agree on a common random element in a cyclic subgroup H of a group G, generated by an element g of prime order q. The security of the Diffie-Hellman exchange relies on the Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) [2] , which states that there is no efficient algorithm that can distinguish the two distributions (g a , g b , g ab ) and (g a , g b , g c ) in G 3 , where 1 ≤ a, b, c ≤ q are chosen at random. Under the DDH assumption, one can agree on a random private element. Hence, one has to derive a random-looking bit-string from this random element. Different approaches were proposed to solve this problem.
One classical way to transform a random group-element to a random-looking bit-string is to apply a hash function to the Diffie-Hellman group-element but the indistinguishability is proved under the random oracle model [1] . An alternative method to hash functions, secure under the standard model, is to use a randomness extractor.
In 1998, Boneh et al. propose in [4] , to extract the least or the most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman element.
In 1999, Håstad et al., [12] , via the Leftover Hash Lemma, propose a probabilistic randomness extractor that can extract entropy from any random source which has sufficient min-entropy. This technic, with its variants [10, 12] , requires the use of hash or pseudorandom functions and an extra perfect randomness, which is a lack for practical use.
In 2000, Carneti et al. [5] show that, in a statistical sense, the k most significant bits of g xy is indistinguishable from a random bit-string of length k, given the k most significant bits of g x and g y . But, in 2001, Boneh et al. observe that this technic cannot be used in practice because in most protocols, the adversary learns all of g x and g y .
In 2008, Fouque et al. show in [9] , under the DDH assumption that k least significant bits or the most significant bits of a random element in a subgroup of Z * p are indistinguishable from a random bit-string of the same length. To prove this, the authors bound the statistical distance by evaluating the L 1 norm, using exponential sums.
In 2009, at Eurocrypt, Chevalier et al. [6] study a quite simple deterministic extractor from random Diffie-Hellman elements defined over a prime order multiplicative subgroup G of Z * p and over the group of points of an elliptic curve. They upper-bound the L 2 norm and use some classical results on exponential sums to prove their results. They improve at the same time the results in [9] . But their works include only prime fields.
In this paper, we extend the above result of Chevalier et al. to non prime finite fields: F p n , with a prime p and a positive integer n greater than 1. The extension of the work of Chevalier et al. on elliptic curves over non prime finite fields was already done in [7] . Here, we present a quite simple deterministic extractor, denoted Ext k for a multiplicative subgroup G of a finite field F p n . In particular for binary finite fields F 2 n , we show under the DDH assumption that the k-first F 2 -coefficients (the k least significant bits) of a random group-element in a subgroup of F * 2 n , are indistinguishable from a random bit-string of the same length. This approach is somewhat similar to those of [7] for deterministic randomness extractor in elliptic curves. Over F p , Chevalier et al. use the "PolyaVinogradov inequality" to bound incomplete character sums [14] but over F * p n we use "Winterhof inequality" to bound incomplete character sums [20] .
The paper is organized as follows : In section 1, we recall some definitions and results about randomness extraction and character sums. In section 2, we present and give an analysis of our extractor. We finish by giving a natural application of our extractor to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange in F
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some definitions and results about entropy and randomness extraction.
Deterministic extractor
Definition 1 (Collision probability). Let S be a finite set and X be an Svalued random variable. The collision probability of X, denoted by Col(X), is the probability
If X and X ′ are identically distributed random variables on S, the collision probability of X is interpreted as Col(X) = Pr[X = X ′ ].
Definition 2 (Statistical distance). Let S be a finite set. If X and Y are S-valued random variables, then the statistical distance ∆(X, Y ) between X and Y is defined as
∆(X, Y ) = 1 2 ∑ s∈S |Pr[X = s] − Pr[Y = s]| .
Definition 3. Let U S be a random variable uniformly distributed on S and δ ≤ 1 a positive real number. Then a random variable X on S is said to be δ-uniform
Let S be a finite set and let (α x ) x∈S be a sequence of real numbers. Then,
Proof. This inequality is a direct consequence of Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
The result can be deduced easily.
Corollary 1. If X is an S-valued random variable then
Lemma 2. Let X be a random variable over a finite set S of size |S| and ϵ = ∆(X, U S ) be the statistical distance between X and U S , where U S is a uniformly distributed random variable over S. Then,
Proof. If ϵ = 0, then the result is an easy consequence of Equation 2. Let suppose that ϵ ̸ = 0 and define
Then ∑ x q x = 1 and by Equation 1, we have
The lemma can be deduced easily.
Definition 4. Let S and T be two finite sets. Let Ext be a function
For more information on extractors, see [16, 18] .
Character sums
In the following, we recall some fundamental results on character sums. We denote by e p the character on F p such that, for all y ∈ F p , e p (y) = e 2iπy p ∈ C * , and by ψ the additive character in F p n such that for all x ∈ F p n , ψ(x) = e p (Tr(x)) where Tr(x) = x + x p + . . . + x p n−1 is the trace of x ∈ F p n to F p .
Lemma 3. Let ψ be an additive character of F p n and let G be a multiplicative subgroup of F * p n . Consider the following Gauss sum T (a, G)
Proof. See [14] or [17] .
Lemma 4. Let V be an additive subgroup of F p n et let ψ be an additive character of
Proof. See [20] for the proof.
For more details on character sums see [14, 15] .
Leftover Hash Lemma
In this subsection, we recall the Leftover Hash Lemma [13, 12] . It is the most famous randomness extractor but it requires the use of universal hash functions.
Definition 5 (Guessing probability).
Let X be a random variable taking values on a set V of size N , the guessing probability γ(X) of X is defined to be γ(X) = max{P [X = v] : v ∈ V}. 
Definition 6 (Universal hash function families). Let H = {h i } i be a family of efficiently computable hash functions
h i : {0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} k , for i ∈ {0, 1} d .
We say that H is a universal hash function family if for every
x ̸ = y in {0, 1} n , Pr i∈{0,1} d [h i (x) = h i (y)] ≤ 1/2 k .
Theorem 1 (Leftover Hash Lemma
Proof. See [19] The Leftover Hash Lemma extracts nearly all of the entropy available whatever the randomness sources are, but it needs to invest few additional truly random bits. To circumvent this problem, we propose a deterministic extractor which is not optimal.
Randomness extraction in F p n
In this section, we propose and prove the security of a simple deterministic randomness extractor for a subgroup G of F p n . The main theorem of this section states that the k-first coefficients of a random element in G are close to a truly random group-element in F k p . Our approach is somewhat similar to those in [7] related to randomness extraction in elliptic curves defined over F p n . In fact, we use the Gaussian exponential sums to bound the statistical distance.
Consider the finite field F p n , where p is prime and n is a positive integer. Then F p n is a n-dimensional vector space over F p . Let {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n } be a basis of F p n over F p . That means, every element x in F p n can be represented in the form x = x 1 α 1 + x 2 α 2 + . . . + x n α n , where x i ∈ F p n . Let G be a subgroup of F p n . The extractor Ext k , for a given random element x of G, outputs the k-first F p -coefficients of x. Definition 7. Let G ⊂ F * p n be a multiplicative subgroup of order q and let k be a positive integer less than n. The extractor Ext k is defined as a function
The following theorem shows that Ext k is a good randomness extractor.
Proof. Let us define the sets
Let us construct the characteristic function
which is equal to 1 if x − y = m and 0 otherwise. Then the size of the set A is given by
Therefore,
we have the following inequalities:
Hence,
For non binary field, we have the following corollary. 
Conclusion
This paper extends the study of the existence of randomness extractors for a subgroup G of a finite prime field Z p to a field of the form F p n where p is a prime and n > 1 an integer. The extractor denoted by Ext k , for a given random element in a subgroup G of F p n , outputs k-first (resp. k-last) F p -coefficients of this element. Our extractor works for any finite field F p n where the DDH assumption holds. Hence, we show that if q is large we can derive random bitstring. In general, they can be used in any cryptographic protocol which requires to extract a random bit-string from a random group-element. As in Fouque et al. [10] for prime field, the large q is the main drawback here for non prime field because q is grater than √ p n . Hence, as further work it will be interesting to improve the bound proposed in this paper.
